{"type":"script","doc_desc":{"producers":[{"name":"Reproducibility WBG","abbr":"DECDI","affiliation":"World Bank - Development Impact Department","role":"Verification and preparation of metadata"}],"prod_date":"2025-11-26","version":"1"},"project_desc":{"authoring_entity":[{"name":"Marc Schiffbauer","affiliation":"World Bank","email":"mschiffbauer@worldbank.org"},{"name":"Mihaly Fazekas","affiliation":"Central European University and Government Transparency Institute","email":"misi.fazekas@gmail.com"},{"name":"Bence Toth","affiliation":"University College London","email":"btoth@govtransparency.eu"},{"name":"Viktoriia Poltoratskaya","affiliation":"Central European University and Government Transparency Institute","email":"vpoltoratskaya@govtransparency.eu"}],"title_statement":{"title":"Reproducibility package for Procuring Low Growth: The Impact Of Political Favoritism On Public Procurement And Firm Performance In Bulgaria","idno":"RR_BGR_2025_399"},"data_statement":"All data is restricted and has not been included in the reproducibility package. For more details, please refer to the README file.","software":[{"name":"Stata","version":"18 MP"}],"scripts":[{"title":"Reproducibility package for Procuring Low Growth: The Impact Of Political Favoritism On Public Procurement And Firm Performance In Bulgaria","date":"2025-11","notes":"Computational reproducibility verified by Development Impact (DECDI) Analytics team, World Bank.","instructions":"See README in reproducibility package.","file_name":"RR_BGR_2025_399","zip_package":"RR_BGR_2025_399.zip","dependencies":"Stata dependencies are listed in the ado folder."}],"repository_uri":[{"name":"Reproducible Research Repository (World Bank)","uri":"https:\/\/reproducibility.worldbank.org"}],"production_date":"2025-11-26","abstract":"This paper assesses the impact of favoritism in public procurement on private sector productivity growth. To this end, it combines three novel microeconomic data sets: administrative data on firms, including more than 4 million firm-year observations and rich financial and ownership information; public procurement transaction data for 150,000 published contracts and their tenders; and a newly assembled data set on firms\u2019 political connections, drawing on asset declarations, sanction lists, and offshore leaks. This comprehensive data set allows tracing the impact of favoritism in allocating government contracts to economic growth. The findings show that politically connected firms are 18 to 32 percent more likely to win public procurement contracts due to their preferential access to uncompetitive tenders. Public procurement results in higher subsequent productivity and employment growth only if it has been awarded through competitive tenders. Firms winning contracts through uncompetitive procedures have flat growth but higher profit margins. Consistent with these findings, the paper shows that firms that are awarded uncompetitive public procurement contracts obtain rents of 9 to 11 percent from overpaid contracts. The results suggest that aggregate annual total factor productivity growth would have been 8 percent higher in the absence of favoritism in public procurement.","geographic_units":[{"name":"Bulgaria","code":"BGR"}],"keywords":[{"name":"Competition"},{"name":"Productivity"},{"name":"Political Connections"},{"name":"Public Procurement"}],"topics":[{"id":"O33","uri":"https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/econlit\/jelCodes.php?view=jel","vocabulary":"Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)","name":"Technological Change: Choices and Consequences \u2022 Diffusion Processes","parent_id":"O3"},{"id":" O47","uri":"https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/econlit\/jelCodes.php?view=jel","vocabulary":"Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)","name":"Empirical Studies of Economic Growth \u2022 Aggregate Productivity \u2022 Cross-Country Output Convergence","parent_id":"O4"},{"id":" D72","uri":"https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/econlit\/jelCodes.php?view=jel","vocabulary":"Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)","name":"Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior","parent_id":"D7"},{"id":" D24","uri":"https:\/\/www.aeaweb.org\/econlit\/jelCodes.php?view=jel","vocabulary":"Journal of Economic Literature (JEL)","name":"Production \u2022 Cost \u2022 Capital \u2022 Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity \u2022 Capacity","parent_id":"D2"}],"output":[{"type":"Working Paper","description":"Policy Research Working Papers (PRWP)","title":"Procuring Low Growth: The Impact Of Political Favoritism On Public Procurement And Firm Performance In Bulgaria"}],"language":[{"name":"English","code":"EN"}],"disclaimer":"The materials in the reproducibility packages are distributed as they were prepared by the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development\/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this event do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the materials included in the reproducibility package.","license":[{"name":"Modified BSD3","uri":"https:\/\/opensource.org\/license\/bsd-3-clause\/"}],"contacts":[{"name":"Marc Schiffbauer","affiliation":"World Bank","email":"mschiffbauer@worldbank.org"},{"name":"Reproducibility WBG","affiliation":"World Bank","email":"reproducibility@worldbank.org"}],"datasets":[{"name":"Orbis Firm-Level Data for Bulgaria","citation":"Moody\u2019s Analytics. Orbis. Retrieved 2021, https:\/\/www.bvdinfo.com","uri":"https:\/\/www.moodys.com\/web\/en\/us\/capabilities\/company-reference-data\/orbis.html","access_type":"Data access was granted directly to the study authors by the data owners\/managers. It was obtained with a custom data license that does not allow for redistribution and it is not included in the reproducibility package.","license_uri":"https:\/\/www.moodys.com\/web\/en\/us\/legal\/terms-of-use.html","note":"Confidential commercial firm-level data from the Orbis database (Moody\u2019s Analytics). The package includes annual raw Orbis files for Bulgaria from 2010\u20132018 containing firm financials, ownership, and company characteristics.\nFiles: datawithlinks_xxxx.dta for years 2010-2018"},{"citation":"Public Procurement Agency Bulgaria. Centralized Electronic Procurement Information System (CAIS EOP). Retrieved 2021, http:\/\/www.aop.bg and https:\/\/app.eop.bg","name":"Bulgarian Public Procurement Micro-Level Data","note":"These datasets contain micro-level public procurement information for Bulgaria, covering contracts awarded between 2010 and 2018. The data are derived from administrative registers and cover nearly the entire economy, including contracts and tenders sourced from the two national e-procurement portals ( http:\/\/www.aop.bg and https:\/\/app.eop.bg). See README for additional details. \nFiles: pp_panel_supplier_year_2011_2019_all.csv; pp_relprice.dta\n","access_type":"Data access was granted directly to the study authors by the data owners\/managers. It was obtained with a custom data license that does not allow for redistribution and it is not included in the reproducibility package."},{"citation":"Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD). 2022. Politically Connected Firms in Bulgaria [dataset]. Compiled for the Bulgaria Country Economic Memorandum: A Path to High Income.","access_type":"Data access was granted directly to the study authors by the data owners\/managers. It was obtained with a custom data license that does not allow for redistribution and it is not included in the reproducibility package.","note":"This dataset identifies politically connected firms in Bulgaria and was constructed by the Center for the Study of Democracy (http:\/\/csd.eu\/) for the report Bulgaria CEM 2022: A Path to High Income(https:\/\/hdl.handle.net\/10986\/38566). Politically connected firms are defined as firms owned or managed by politically exposed persons, identified using asset declarations and firm tax identifiers from Orbis (bvdidnumber with prefix \u201cBG\u201d).\nIt contains firm-level dummy variables indicating different types of political connections (e.g., national executive, legislative, local government, and state-owned enterprises).\nFiles: PC firms 2010-2021.dta","name":"Politically Connected Firms in Bulgaria"}],"technology_requirements":"Run time: ~ 5 hours","reproduction_instructions":"To reproduce the findings in this paper, a replicator must:\n1. **Secure Access to Data:** Access the datasets not included in the package. See subsection Datasets for more details.\n2. **Download and Place Data:** Once the data is accessed, users should place it in the appropriate folder.\n3. **Run the Package:** After placing the data in the folder, run the files in the order:\n      - Update the global in line 22 of the do-file \"Procuring misallocation WBPR replication\" to your folder's location and run the do-file.\n\nSince all the data is not included, the package includes the results produced by replicators. These files can be used to review the results presented in the paper.","technology_environment":"Paper exhibits were reproduced on a computer with the following specifications:\n\u2022 OS: Windows 11 Enterprise\n\u2022 Processor: INTEL(R) XEON(R) PLATINUM 8562Y+ 2.80 GHz (2 processors)\n\u2022 Memory available: 32 GB"},"tags":[{"tag":"DOI"},{"tag":"Open Code"},{"tag":"Restricted Data"}],"schematype":"script"}